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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 





WALTER T. STEWART and 






Case No. 14349 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action arises out of a dispute between 
the plaintiffs and defendants over a section of land. 
The plaintiffs hold title by deed to a section of land 
upon which defendants have historically occupied. The 
defendants also hold title by deed to a section of land 
which the plaintiffs have historically occupied. This 
action arises out of the dispute over the section of land 
which defendants hold title to but which plaintiffs 
occupy. 
Defendants also allege a right-of-way across 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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this strip of land and a right to a well which lies near 
the property line which divides the properties of plaintiffs 
and defendants. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial judge sitting without a jury found a 
boundary of acquiescence giving title to the disputed 
area occupied by plaintiffs to them. The trial judge 
further ordered the defendants to remove the bridges and 
a cattle guard partially located on the property in dis-
pute. The Court found that defendants had not establish-
ed a right-of-way over the property in dispute. The 
trial court further denied defendants an injunction 
against plaintiffs1 use of the well. 
NATURE OF RELEASE SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek affirmance of the trial court's 
decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1942 plaintiffs purchased farm property in 
the Benjamin area, the farm property lying to the west 
of a farm belonging to Ren Stewart. (Tr. 33, lines 22-27) 
-2-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
At that time there was a fence on the east side of a 
strip of land on the east side of plaintiffs1 title 
and the Ren Stewart farm as shown on plaintiffs1 Exhibit 
No. 2, a copy of a pertinent portion of the Exhibit is 
included herein as Figure "1". (Tr. 29, lines 21-30; Tr. 
30, lines 1-2; Tr. 34, lines 19-30; Tr. 35, lines 1-9; 
Tr. 104, lines 12-16) In 1942 plaintiffs occupied their 
farm property and the green shaded portion on Figure "1". 
At the time of the plaintiffs1 occupancy plaintiffs occupied 
the green shaded portion on Figure "1" and the defendants 
occupied the pink shaded portion on Figure "1" and have 
so occupied the respective areas since that time. The 
survey shows that the title by deed to the green shaded 
portion is in defendants as successors in interest to Ren 
Stewart and the title to the pink shaded portion is in the 
plaintiffs. (Ex. 2; Tr. 71, lines 17-30; Tr. 72, lines 
1-8) The green shaded portion on Exhibit No. 1 and Figure 
"1" is the area to which plaintiffs claim ownership 
pursuant to boundary by acquiescence. The testimony of 
Defendant Walter Stewart indicates that fence lines running 
on the west and south of the pink shaded area and the 
north and east side of the green shaded area were placed 
there over 75 years ago and prior to the time of any 
-3-
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survey. (Tr. 104, lines 12-26; Tr. 19, lines 13-lb) In 
1942 the plaintiffs purchased the property witnout survey 
and began occupying all of the area including the green 
shaded area. (Tr. 35, lines 5-11; Tr. 41, lines 5-8; Tr. 
47, lines 16-27) The testimony of the witnesses indicates 
that the plaintiffs had exclusive possession between 1942 
and 1966 when the defendants moved their residence to the 
Ren Stewart farm and became the owners thereof. This 
period of twenty-four (24) years of exclusive occupancy 
by plaintiffs is unrebutted. (Tr. 27, lines 6-12; Tr. 
27, lines 27-30; Tr. 28, line 4) Witness Carl Lindstrom 
testified that plaintiffs had exclusive occupancy of the 
green shaded portion of the property and that no one had 
made use of it except the plaintiffs, other than down-
stream users of irrigation water to make changes in the 
water headgates. (Tr. 27, JLines27-30; Tr. 30, lines 
15-20) North of the plaintiffs1 property and west of the 
defendants' property the county road is paved and the 
road makes a slight bend to the west and then stops 
prior to entry upon the plaintiffs1 property. (Ex. 2) At 
that point a gate is placed for entrance to the plaintiffs1 
property. That gate has been closed each year during the 
-4-
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entire term since 1942 to the present. Many times during 
each year and every pheasant season that gate was closed 
to prevent trespass across the plaintiffs1 property. 
(Tr. 9, lines 4-12; Tr. 92, lines 1-10; Tr. 178, lines 
28-30; Tr. 179, lines 1-7) The defendants had maintained 
a corral for their cattle north of their house for several 
years. In 1972 the defendants moved the corral to the 
south end of their property and right next to the fence 
which boardered the green shaded area. (Tr. 49, lines 
5-18) At that time, in 1972, defendants commenced travers-
ing the plaintiffs1 property and the green shaded portion 
of the property to get to their corral instead of building 
a road each of their house through their own fields and 
property, to their own corral. (Tr. 49, lines 19-22) 
They constructed two bridges across the irrigation ditch 
that runs west of and parallel to the fence on the east 
side of the green shaded area. (Tr. 49, lines 23-27; 
Tr. 192, lines 24-30) This action gave rise to this 
suit. 
In approximately 1934 plaintiffs1 precedessor 
in interest appropriated and drilled a well on plaintiffs1 
property near the section line and near the north end of 
the green shaded area. (Tr. 164, lines 4-11; Tr. 165, 
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lines 6-11) That well was not used for a number of years. 
In 1950 the well was opened and the plaintiffs began 
drawing their culinary water from the well. (Tr. 208, 
lines 9-12) Plaintiffs also allowed defendants1 pre-
decessor in interest to draw a culinary pipeline from 
the well. In 19 56 the defendants filed an application to 
drill a culinary well near their house, which application 
was approved by the State Engineer in 1957. (Tr. 207, 
lines 13-16) In 1965 plaintiffs filed a change applica-
tion to convert the 1934 well from irrigation usage to 
culinary usage, which was approved by the State Engineer. 
(Tr. 226, lines 1-8) Defendants continued to draw water 
from the plaintiffs1 well. (Tr. 202, lines 8-12) In 
1969 the plaintiffs demanded that the defendants disconnect 
their water pipe from plaintiffs1 well and connect to 
their own culinary well. (Tr. 185, lines 16-21; Tr. 206, 
lines 14-18; Tr. 2077 lines~T7-2^6) Defendants lodged 
a protest with the State Engineer regarding plaintiffs1 
use of the well. (Tr. 206, lines 19-22; Tr. 185, lines 
26-30; Tr. 186, lines 1-10) In November, 1969, the State 
Engineer informed them that they should disconnect from 
the plaintiffs1 well and connect to their own culinary 
well which was an approved application. (Ex. 18; Tr. 186, 
lines 11-26). 
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POINT I 
THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT OF A BOUNDARY BY 
ACQUIESCENCE IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE 
The first three points of defendants1 brief 
deal with a single question, although framed to appear 
as three separate questions. The single question being 
whether or not the evidence presented to the Court supports 
the Court's finding of a boundary by acquiescence. 
The trial court found that the line claimed by 
plaintiffs has been recognized by the parties and their 
predecessors in interest as the boundary between the 
properties since territorial days. (R. 15) Defendant 
Walter Stewart testified that the fence which lies to 
the west of the pink shaded area and to the east of the 
green shaded area is a single continuous fence. (Tr. 12, 
lines 22-29) Defendant Walter Stewart further admits 
that this fence lying to the north and east of the green 
shaded area in Figure "1" was erected some time around 
the turn of the century. (Tr. 18, lines 5-9 and 26-30; 
Tr. 104, lines 12-18; Tr. 105, lines 1-5) There is 
no evidence other than that this fence has been in existence 
since the turn of the century. (Tr. 36, lines 1-13) The 
Plaintiff LaVon Payne testified that no survey was made 
at the time the plaintiffs purchased the property from 
their predecessors, Tuckers. (Tr. 71, lines 27-28) They 
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also did not know about the actual title line until 
years afterward. (Tr. 38, lines 6-11) This occurred 
when Mr. Tucker took the title through court. (Tr. 71, 
lines 24-30; Tr. 72, lines 1-8) The Plaintiff LaVon 
Payne further testified that when plaintiffs bought the 
property, the fences were in existence, they accepted 
them and assumed that the property shaded in "green" was 
theirs. (Tr. 72, lines 1-8) The testimony at the trial 
adequately supports the findings that the fence was in 
existence since territorial times and that it was accepted 
by the predecessors in interest and by the parties as the 
boundary line between their properties. 
The circumstances of entry through plaintiffs1 
gate across plaintiffs' property to get to the green 
shaded area, the fact that the road only leads to the 
plaintiffs1 property and has not been used according to 
Mr. Lindstrom by anyone other than plaintiffs and their^ 
guests since 1942 until 1972, placed the factual situation 
directly in line with the reasoning of the Utah decisions. 
There are a number of Utah Supreme Court decisions 
bearing on the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. The 
most recent and clear pronouncement of that is found in 
Baum v. Defa, (1974) 525 P.2d 725, where the opinion of 
the Supreme Court, affirmed the judgment of the same 
-8-
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trial judge that tried the case now before the Court. 
The Court said at page 726: 
Its essence is that where there has been any 
type of a recognizable physical boundary, 
which has been accepted as such for a long 
period of time, it should be presumed that 
any dispute or disagreement over the boundary 
has been reconciled in some manner. 
This Court went on to define what a long period 
of time is, by which the boundary by acquiescence may be 
established when it continued at page 726: 
. . .there is no exact period which constitutes 
such 'long period of time1. However, it has 
usually been related to the prescriptive period 
of 20 years which was regarded at common law 
as the time 'since the memory of man runneth 
not to the contrary.' 
Baum v. Defa, further went on to apply the rule 
in a factual situation similar to that now before the 
Court when in the opinion it was said at page 727: 
. . . if the property on either side of 
such a fence is conveyed to separate parties, 
so that there comes into being separate 
ownership of the tracts on either side, and the 
circumstances are such that the parties 
should reasonably be assumed to accept the 
fence as the boundary between their properties, 
then from that time on, the time during which 
the fence continues to exist, should be 
regarded as going toward fulfilling the time 
requirement for the establishment of a 
boundary by acquiescence. 
The evidence is uncontroverted that from 1942 when 
plaintiffs purchased and occupied their land, until 1966, a 
period of some 24 years, the circumstances were such that 
-9-
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the parties could reasonably be assumed to accept the 
fence as the boundary. It was not until 1972, when the 
defendants herein attempted to cross and make use of the 
green shaded area, that a dispute arose. 
Thus, this fence and the occupancy of the pink 
shaded area by defendants and their predecessors and the 
occupancy of the green shaded area by the plaintiffs and 
their predecessors fall squarely in line with the reasoning 
and the factual circumstances of Baum v. Defa. 
Going back to some of the earlier cases that 
shed light on the particular fact situation in the case 
before the Court, we find in Holmes v. Judge, (1906), 31 
Utah 269, 87 Pac. 1009, the Court said at page 277: 
It is squarely held, however, that long 
acquiescence in a boundary that is visibly 
marked, or placed where it can be and is 
observed by the adjoining owner, is sufficient 
to establish a boundary from which neither 
party may depart at will. 
The decision in Baum v. Defa really clarified 
what had been previously announced by the Holmes case. 
In Young v. Hyland, (1910), 37 Utah 229, 108 
Pac. 1124, the Court clarified that where a fence line or 
other monument had been placed in before official surveys, 
that nevertheless would constitute the boundary where it 
had been acquiesced in for a long period of time saying 
at page 234: 
-10-
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. . . where the owners of adjoining lands 
occupy their respective premises up to a 
certain line which they recognized and 
acquiesced in as their boundary line for 
a long period of time, they and their 
grantees will not be permitted to deny that 
the boundary line thus recognized is the 
true line of division between their pro-
perties . . . A practical location of a 
boundary line may be, and often is, agreed 
upon, fixed, and established, either by an 
express agreement, or by acquiescence, without 
surveys. It may be so agreed to and fixed 
before, as well as after, the making of an 
official survey. 
In 1912, in Farr Development Co. v. Thomas, et 
al., (1912) 41 Utah 1, 122 Pac. 906, at page 3: 
. . . all that is necessary to be, or that 
can be, said by us on the question that 
where owners of adjoining lands have occupied 
their respective premises up to a certain line, 
which they and their predecessors in interest 
recognized and acquiesced in as their boundary 
line for a long period of time, neither they, 
nor their grantees or privies in estate, will 
be permitted to deny that the boundary line 
so recognized and acquired in as the true 
line of division between their properties. 
In Tanner v. Stratton, (1914) 44 Utah 253, 139 
Pac. 940, with facts which closely parallel ours, being 
the occupancy of the land up to the fence line and not 
beyond, which is exactly the circumstance we have here 
where plaintiffs occupy the green shaded portion up to the 
fence line and do not occupy beyond the fence even though 
they have legal title to the pink shaded portion occupied 
by the defendants, and upon which defendants1 predecessors 
built half of their house, the Court said at page 255: 
-11-
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There is no direct evidence that the north 
portion was built on the line with his express 
consent or by agreement. But it was there 
for more than twenty years, marking the 
boundary line. He cultivated and occupied 
up to the fence, and at no time occupied or 
claimed any ground beyond it, and located 
the latter portion of the fence in a direct 
line with it. All this indicates, not only 
a mere recognition and acquiescence in the 
old fence line as and for a boundary line, 
but consent as well, facts from which consent 
may be implied. 
In the case before the Court it is significant 
that from 1942 to 1972 until the moving of the corrals by 
the defendants to the rear of their property, they made 
no efforts to assert or claim or attempt to make use of 
the green shaded portion other than the occupation by the 
respective parties, upon each side of the fence. No 
altercations over this boundary occurred until 1972, a 
period of some thirty (30) years after defendants purchased 
the property from their predecessors, Tuckers. In 
Provonsha v. Pitman, (1957),6 Utah 2d 26, 305 P.2d 486, 
the Court indicated that subsequent grantees (in our case 
the defendants, from their parents) could not marshal a 
disagreement created at a later date to disavow the previously 
established boundary by acquiescence. As pointed out in 
Lane v. Walker, (1973), 29 Utah 2d 119, 505 P.2d 1199 at 
page 120: 
'Acquiescence1 is more nearly synonymous 
with 'indolence,' or 'consent by silence,'— 
-12-
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or a knowledge that a fence or other monuments 
appear to be a boundary. . . . 
A physical examination of Exhibits 1 and 2 
readily shows the physical boundary and the use of the 
property by the respective parties. 
In Olsen v. Park Daughters Investment Co., (1973), 
29 Utah 2d 421, 511 P.2d 145, the Court stated at page 
425: 
Its essence is that where there arises a 
dispute as to the boundary between properties, 
and it appears that there is a recognizable 
physical boundary of any character, which has 
been acquiesced in as a boundary for a long 
period of time, the conflict should be 
conclusively presumed to have been reconciled 
in some manner. 
The lack of a dispute for a long period of time 
is born out by the testimony of Mr. Carl Lindstrom, Plaintiff 
LaVon Payne and even by Defendant Walter Stewart, himself, 
who indicated that until he returned in 1966, although 
he was residing in Salt Lake City, no efforts were made 
to disavow the obvious and apparent boundary. 
The defendants1 citation to Tripp v. Bagley, 
(1928) 74 Utah 57, 276 Pac. 912, is not appropo since no 
survey had been made of the property, the title line was 
not known (Tr. 19, lines 14-16; Tr. 71, lines 17-28) and 
the plaintiffs testified that from the time of their 
occupancy until this dispute arose, they had always 
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understood the boundary to be the fence. (Tr. 72, lines 
1-8) The evidence presented to the trial court in light 
of the citations above quoted clearly support the finding 
of the trial court of the boundary by acquiescence, and 
in fact would impell the trial court to no other decision. 
POINT II 
THE ASSERTION THAT PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS ARE 
ESTOPPED FROM DENYING DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS 
ACCESS TO THE LAND IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE LAW 
OR EVIDENCE AND THE RULING BY THE TRIAL COURT 
THAT DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS DO NOT HAVE A 
RIGHT-OF-WAY ACROSS PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS1 
PROPERTY IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EVIDENCE 
AND THE LAW 
In Point IV of the defendants1 brief, defendants 
contend that the plaintiffs were estopped from denying 
defendants access to the green shaded area. The defendants 
are in the dubious and inconsistent position of asserting 
by Points I, II and III, that they claim ownership of the 
green shaded area, and then in Point IV, alleging that 
they have established a right-of-way across the green 
shaded area. In order to make such assertion of an 
establishment of a right-of-way, there would have to be an 
acknowledgement that the property does, in fact, belong 
to the plaintiffs, and proof of the required criteria for 
establishment of an easement by prescription upon the 
green shaded portion by defendants. The testimony and 
finding by the Court as to the use of the green shaded 
-14-
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area by the defendants and their predessessors in interest, 
is that their only use was by permission of the plaintiffs 
and their predecessors. Mr. Carl Lindstrom, a resident 
of the area, testified that there were no bridges across 
the fence line into the green area from the defendants' 
property since 1936 when he moved into the area. (Tr. 
27, lines 11-16) He also went on to testify that there 
was no way in which to cross from the green area across 
the fence, since there were no bridges across the irriga-
tion canal. (Tr. 29, lines 12-30; Tr. 30, lines 1-7) 
There was also testimony that the fence was present in 
1942 when plaintiffs Payne purchased the property (Tr. 
34, lines 27-30; Tr. 35, lines 1-9) and that the pre-
decessaros in interest of the defendants made no use of 
this green area during the time which plaintiffs occupied 
the property. (Tr. 27, lines 27-30; Tr. 30, lines 1-4; 
Tr. 38, lines 28-30; Tr. 39, line 1) 
The uncontroverted testimony in the case established 
that except for occasional visitors to the plaintiffs, that 
no one had made use of the green area except the plaintiffs 
and their predecessors in interest. Defendants moved no 
equipment down that lane. (Tr. 27, lines 27-30; Tr. 28, 
lines 1-4; Tr. 43, lines 3-16) There was some testimony 
to the effect that a Mr. Reynolds had used the lane. 
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However, this was in connection with his church capacities 
and was a use with plaintiffs1 permission, (Tr. 92, lines 
3-25; Tr. 93, lines 11-20) He was an invitee of both the 
plaintiffs and the defendants. (Tr. 156, lines 15-30; 
Tr. 157, lines 3-5) Also there was some testimony that 
a Mr. Harris used the lane. Mr. Harris1 use, however, 
was in connection with his water rights as he was a down-
stream user of the ditch and, therefore, had a right to 
use the lane. Also, Mr. Harris had a Mr. Fitzwater who 
was a hired man who could use the road for access to his 
ditch. (Tr. 219, lines 7-14) None of these usages 
were in behalf of defendants and would not create any 
right in them. 
The case law which is pertinent is found in 
a case decided in 1948, Savage v. Nielsen, (1948), 114 
Utah 22, 197 P.2d 117, at page 32, which stated: 
. . . A right of way by prescription 
can only be attained by satisfying 
certain other requirements. These 
requirements may, for all practical 
purposes, be included within the 
three set out below, although the 
cases under particular fact situations 
have emphasized other subdivisions. The 
three uses are: (1) Continuous; (2) 
Open; and (3) Adverse under a claim of 
right. 
The court went on to say at page 33: 
It is well established as the rule in 
Utah that the prescriptive period is 
twenty years as it was at the common 
law. 
- u _ 
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The Court, on testimony, very similar to the 
testimony in the case now before us, cited with approval 
in the Savage case from Jensen v. Gerrard, (1935), 85 
Utah 41, 39 P.2d 1070 at page 1073: 
A twenty-year use alone of a way is not 
sufficient to establish an easement. Mere 
use of a roadway opened by a landowner for 
his own purposes will be presumed permissive. 
An antagonistic or adverse use of a way 
cannot spring from a permissive use. A 
prescriptive title must be acquired adversely. 
It cannot be adverse when it rests upon a 
license or mere neighborly accommodation. 
Adverse user is the antithesis of permissive 
user. If the use is accompanied by any 
recognition in express terms or by implication 
of a right in the landowner to stop such use 
now or at some time in the future, the use 
is not adverse. (Emphasis suppliedj 
As stated in Zollinger v. Frank, (1946) 110 
Utah 514, 175 P.2d 714 at page 517: 
Regardless of the words used to charac-
terize this element of the nature of 
the use necessary to give rise to a pre-
scriptive easement, it is our opinion that the 
courts mean that the use must be against the 
owner as distinguished from under the 
owner. 
The evidence and the finding of the Court was that all usage was 
permissive. 
As stated in Chournos v. Alkema, (1972), 27 
Utah 2d 244, 494 P.2d 950, the Court said at page 248: 
One cannot claim a right of way as a private 
one by showing that it has been used by 
the public; he must show user by himself or 
by his predecessors of the way to his own 
lot. 
-1 7_ 
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Therefore, the evidence attempted to be utilized 
by the defendants herein to show that others, such as Harris 
or Reynolds, use of the right-of-way would not establish 
any right in the defendants. As stated in Nielson v. 
Sandberg, (1943), 105 Utah 93, 141 P.2d 696, at page 
101: 
An easement, being a burden upon the 
land which it traverses is limited to 
uses for which, or by which it was 
acquired, and to the person who acquired 
it, or for the benefit of the property 
for which it was acquired. Said the 
Washington Court in Lund v. Johnson, 
162 Wash. 525, 298 Pac. 702, 704: 
. . .'The party claiming the right must 
show that he has acquired it by his own 
use independent of others; he cannot 
make his right depend in any degree 
upon the enjoyment of a similar right 
by others.' Jones on Easements, Par. 
273; Cox v. Forrest, 60 Md. 74; Dodge 
v. Stacy, 39 Vt. 558. 
The evidence in this case is that the only use 
by the defendants or people acting in their behalf was a 
permissive use, such visitors constituted church authorities 
and other visitors and family members at family reunions 
that were allowed onto the property. (Tr. 92, Tr. 93) 
While it is true that Mr. Walter T. Stewart, Jr. stated 
he had used the green shaded area (Tr. 137, lines 9-14), 
this had only been within the last seven (7) years and 
is not sufficient to acquire a prescriptive right, being 
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less than twenty (20) years. 
Another of the uncontroverted facts is that 
plaintiffs closed the lane area with a gate at least 
every pheasant season and approximately ten (10) times 
per year. (Tr. 92, lines 3-11) This was substantiated 
by the Defendant Ruth Stewart when she stated that 
the gate was always closed during pheasant season. (Tr. 
178, lines 28-30 and Tr. 179, lines 1-7). 
The testimony of Defendant Ruth Stewart, herself, 
supported by the testimony of Plaintiff LaVon Payne shows 
that the right-of-way could never be established where the 
way had been closed off several times of every year by the 
plaintiffs since their occupancy in 1942. 
The evidence presented to the trial court as 
applied to the law shows that the finding and ruling of 
the Court is in conformity with the law on establishment 
of right-of-way by prescription and that the defendants 
failed in their burden of proof on this point in their 
counterclaim. 
POINT III 
THE COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS 
HAD FAILED IN THEIR BURDEN OF PROOF ON THEIR COUNTERCLAIM 
REQUESTING AN INJUNCTION AGAINST THE PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS 
USE OF WELL 
The well was first applied for in 1934 according to 
defendants' own statement. Defendants had knowledge of 
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plaintiffs1 usage from the well commencing in 1950. (Tr. 
208, lines 9-30) Defendants were also using water from the 
plaintiffs' well. Defendants prepared an agreement and sub-
mitted it to plaintiffs for usage of water from plaintiffs1 
well, but plaintiffs refused to sign the agreement pre-
pared by defendants. (Tr. 203, lines 1-5) Defendants 
filed their own application number 28237 for a well for 
water for their own culinary use in 1956, at a time when 
they were using a water line from plaintiffs1 well under 
a license from plaintiffs. (Tr. 202, lines 8-30) This 
application was approved in 1957. (Tr. 107, lines 3-16, 
Ex. 18) In 1965, plaintiffs filed a change application to 
convert their well claim number 5309 from irrigation to 
culinary, which was approved by the State Engineer. In 
1969, the defendants initiated a protest with the State 
Engineer. As a result of that protest, the defendants re-
ceived a letter (Ex. 18) from the State Engineer informing 
them that they should connect to their own well under 
appropriated and approved application number 28237, as 
they had no rights in plaintiffs' well. The defendants 
claims regarding the use by plaintiffs of the well should 
have been acted upon pursuant to Title 73, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended. The trial court went into 
this matter specifically and concluded that these water 
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rights had been used for some twenty-five (25) years and 
the defendants1 claim to a right to injunctive relief 
against the usage of the well had long since been barred 
by the statute of limitations. (Tr. 201, lines 7-30; Tr. 
202, line 1) The defendants are in the inconsistent 
position of having made use of the water from 1950 to 
1970 under a license from the plaintiffs and now claim 
to the Court that there has been an abandonment of this 
water right. If in fact there had been an abandonment of 
water rights, the water would have been available for 
appropriation and an application to the State Engineer 
for appropriation would have brought the matter before 
the State Engineer for decision pursuant to the procedures 
outlined in Title 73, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
The defendants1 failure to pursue their rights 
under Title 73, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
with plaintiffs' continuous usage of the well since 1950, 
bars their claim for an injunction. 
Any claim of defendants herein to have the 
Court grant an injunction has long since been barred by the 
statute of limitations and the trial court correctly 
ruled that it did not have jurisdiction or a legal basis 
on which to act upon the counterclaim asking for 
injunction. 
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CONCLUSION 
The record (tried to the Court as both the 
trier of the fact and the law) discloses that the 
determination by the Court is well supported by not 
only plaintiffs' evidence, but by the admissions of the 
defendants of the establishment of the boundary by 
acquiescence. The trial court ruled correctly in light 
of all Utah Supreme Court cases that plaintiffs had 
established their burden of proof and had ownership of 
the disputed green shaded area by boundary by acquiescence, 
The defendants failed to establish proof of the 
necessary criteria that they had established an easement 
by prescription over the plaintiffs' property. Defendants 
failed in their burden of proof to establish any basis 
upon which the Court would have jurisdiction for or the 
right to grant their request for an injunction against 
the plaintiffs' use of the well. 
The Court should affirm the trial court in all 
points in this matter. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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